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Abstract 
The paper studies whether and how CEO turnover in Ukrainian firms is related to their 
performance. Based on a novel dataset covering Ukrainian joint stock companies in 
2002-2006, the paper finds statistically significant negative association between the past 
performance of firms measured by return on sales and return on assets, and the 
likelihood of managerial turnover. While the strength of the turnover-performance 
relationship does not seem to depend on factors such as managerial ownership and 
supervisory board size, we do find significant entrenchments effects associated with 
ownership by managers. Overall, our analysis suggests that corporate governance in 
Ukraine operates with a certain degree of efficiency, despite the well-known lacunas in 
the country’s institutional environment.  
 
Keywords: corporate governance, managerial labor market, transition, Ukraine. 
JEL: G34, J40, L29. 
 
January 2009 
________________________ 
† Corresponding author. 
* Kyiv School of Economics. 
‡ IZA, DIW Berlin, and St. Petersburg University Graduate School of Management. 
 2
1. Introduction 
When economic transformation started in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s, the initial 
focus of both academics and policy-makes was on macro-issues, such as 
macroeconomic stabilization, liberalization of prices and foreign trade, as well as 
privatization – a standard set of Washington consensus reforms. After less than a 
decade, there was a remarkable shift in attention from this initial agenda to the need of 
filling in institutional gaps inherited by transition countries from the era of socialism 
(Mitra et al. 2008). In particular, there was a growing understanding that the success of 
the economic reform on the micro-level would to a large extent be determined by the 
emergence of effective institutions of corporate governance, which would promote 
restructuring of formerly state-owned enterprises, eventually contributing to their 
improved performance (Dyck 2001). 
As in developed market economies, corporate governance problems facing 
transition countries stem from the separation of ownership and control and the 
divergence of interests of principals (shareholders) and agents (managers). In the 
absence of well-functioning governance mechanisms, as the corporate governance 
literature argues, managers may expropriate investors’ funds, engage in empire 
building, or simply live an easy life (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Among various 
corporate governance mechanisms that ensure managerial discipline, the managerial 
labor market plays a key role. In particular, performance-based compensation schemes 
stimulate managers to maximize profit and shareholder value, while the threat of 
dismissal prevents them from shirking and/or engaging in expropriation of investors’ 
funds.  
It is widely acknowledged that the corporate governance problem has had an 
extra dimension in transition countries. During the socialist period, managers of state 
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enterprises were appointed for their adherence to the state-supported ideology or 
because they were proficient in lobbying the government for credits and securing 
delivery of inputs (Shleifer and Vasiliev 1996). In the 1990s, most of these skills 
became of little or no value and incompetence of many managers in the emerging 
market environment became apparent. In other words, the countries of Eastern Europe 
entered the transition period with considerable mismatch between managerial talent and 
productive assets (Roland 2000). The lack of ability on the part of the existing 
managers, and their entrenchment, raised concerns about whether introducing 
appropriate incentives would have any positive effect on enterprise restructuring and 
performance. It might well be the case that the governance problems could not be 
resolved without replacing the incumbent pre-privatization managers in the first place 
(Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc 2006).  
These factors explain recent interest among both academics and policy-makes in 
the functioning of the managerial labor market in transition countries. Managerial pay 
and performance, factors triggering dismissal of incumbents and those leading to the 
appointments of inside versus outside successors, as well as the effect of managerial 
turnover on enterprise performance are among the topics that have stayed high on the 
research agenda in the region. The empirical research remains, however, hampered by 
the limited availability of data, apart from a few relatively well-studied countries such 
as the Czech Republic and Russia (e.g., Claessens and Djankov 1999, Fidrmuc and 
Fidrmuc 2005, Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc 2007, Muravyev 2003a, Kapelyushnikov and 
Demina 2005).  
Our paper focuses on corporate governance in Ukraine, a transition country that, 
despite recent scholarly interest, remains relatively poorly studied by economists. The 
country occupies a particular position among transition economies. It is the only state in 
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the Eastern European region that has experienced a prolonged decline from 1991 to 
1999, with GDP falling by nearly 60 percent (EBRD 2001). It is also among the 
countries that introduced very few reforms in the course of the 1990s. In particular, 
Ukraine is known for slow, convoluted and politicized privatization (Estrin and 
Rosevear 2003). Also, a sound legal framework regulating the creation and operation of 
corporations – the core of the modern economies – was established in Ukraine only in 
2008, with the adoption of the Law on Joint-Stock Companies. Before that, the legal 
basis consisted of largely outdated acts (e.g., the Law on Economic Associations) that 
were adopted in 1991, when the country was still a part of the USSR. The weak legal 
framework, combined with ineffective enforcement of law (see, e.g., Pistor et al. 2000), 
raised considerable concerns about the quality of corporate governance in the country. 
Indeed, as suggested by Schnytzer and Andreyeva (2002), Ukrainian firms in 1998 still 
behaved as if they were “… in a loosely reformed Soviet environment where exchange 
via interpersonal connections, rather than the price mechanism, determined the 
allocation of resources”.   
In this paper we take a look at a particular aspect of corporate governance in 
Ukraine, the sensitivity of managerial turnover to the past performance of firms. Such 
an analysis can be regarded as a crude test of the overall efficiency of corporate 
governance in the country (Gibson 2003). Indeed, an effective corporate governance 
system requires that badly performing incumbents are systematically replaced by new, 
more skilled and better motivated, managers. In addition, we examine how managerial 
turnover is related to several other factors, such as managerial ownership, supervisory 
board size, leverage, and liquidity of firms. The role of corporate boards is of particular 
importance as regulations concerning board size and the exact distribution of power 
between corporate boards and shareholders’ meetings have been a subject of intense 
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debates among academics, policy-makers, and practitioners.  
Using a new dataset on Ukrainian joint-stock companies, which we assemble 
from companies’ reports to the regulator, State Commission on Securities and the Stock 
Market, we find evidence of an inverse relationship between past performance of 
companies and the likelihood of managerial turnover. This result is robust to controlling 
for a number of important factors, such as firm size, leverage, liquidity, supervisory 
board size, as well as important characteristics of chief executives, such as experience 
and gender. We also find that higher managerial ownership reduces CEO turnover, 
indicating entrenchment effects. However, there is no evidence in the data that 
managerial ownership affects the strength of the turnover-performance relationship. The 
same is true of the size of supervisory boards. Overall, our analysis suggests that 
Ukraine passes the crude test of the efficiency of corporate governance, despite all the 
institutional weaknesses accompanying the country’s transition process.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a brief review of 
the literature on managerial turnover – performance relationship, with a particular 
emphasis on the Eastern European region. The data and sample are described in Section 
3. Section 4 discusses the methodological approach adopted in the study. Section 5 
presents main results of the empirical analysis.  Section 6 concludes.     
 
2. Literature review 
There is an extensive literature on the managerial labor market (and the relationship 
between managerial performance and turnover in particular) that dates back to the 1980s 
(Coughlan and Schmidt 1985, Warner et al. 1988, Weisbach 1988, Jensen and Murphy 
1990). These and other studies have established an inverse relationship between the 
likelihood of managerial turnover and corporate performance in a number of developed 
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economies, most notably the US and the UK. Further research shows that the 
performance-turnover relationship is influenced by board size (Yermack 1996), board 
composition (Weisbach 1988), and ownership (Kang and Shivdasani 1995). Dismissals 
of CEOs are found to be associated with positive abnormal stock performance (Dennis 
and Dennis 1995), especially when outside successors are appointed as new managers 
(Rosenstein and Wyatt 1997).  
Summarizing the available evidence, Djankov and Murrell (2002) suggest that 
managerial turnover is almost always effective in improving enterprise performance in 
Western countries. As regards transition and emerging economies, the picture is less 
clear-cut as many institutions of corporate governance remain underdeveloped in these 
countries. Indeed, a clear link between enterprise performance and managerial turnover 
may not exist in transition countries due to the imperfections in the protection of 
property rights, underdevelopment of the financial market, as well as due to the 
intervention by the state (Muravyev 2003b). How the managerial labor market operates 
in these economies remains, therefore, an interesting and important empirical question 
(Gibson 2003). 
Despite a rapid expansion in recent years, the relevant literature remains scarce. 
There is some evidence suggesting the importance of new managerial human capital for 
enterprise restructuring and improved performance in transition countries. One of the 
early studies of the impact of managerial turnover on corporate performance is that by 
Barberis et al. (1996). Using a survey of 452 Russian privatized shops, they find that the 
presence of new management matters for restructuring, which is measured by shop 
renovations, supplier changes, store hours increases, and layoffs. Claessens and 
Djankov (1999) report for the Czech Republic that the appointment of new managers in 
1993-1997 is associated with improvements in corporate performance measured by 
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profit margins and labor productivity. The result is particularly strong if new managers 
are selected by private owners rather than government officials. The finding that 
replacing a CEO in a newly privatized firm improves firm performance in the Czech 
Republic is confirmed in Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc (2007). 
Another strand of literature looks at the relationship between past performance 
of firms and the likelihood of senior management turnover. For example, Gibson (2003) 
focuses on the link between corporate performance and CEO turnover using a sample of 
over 1,200 non-financial firms in eight emerging markets (Brazil, Chile, India, Korea, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Taiwan, and Thailand). He finds that the probability of CEO 
turnover rises with poor performance of firms, which suggests that corporate 
governance in the selected emerging markets is not ineffective. Gibson also finds that 
the presence of a large domestic private shareholder does not improve corporate 
governance.   
Eriksson (2005) provides some evidence that poor corporate performance in the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia results in a higher likelihood of managerial turnover. 
Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc (2007) report a similar relationship for Czech firms, but only 
three to four years after their privatization. Muravyev (2003a) studies determinants of 
CEO turnover using a sample of over 400 privatized firms in Russia. Past performance 
measured by labor productivity is found to be an important factor triggering CEO 
replacement in underperforming firms. Furthermore, outside ownership, smaller size of 
corporate boards, control changes, and financial constraints are associated with higher 
rates of managerial turnover. Similar results are reported by Kapelyushnikov and 
Demina (2005), who identify three main determinants influencing CEO turnover in 
Russia: ownership structure, control changes, and financial performance. Interestingly, 
Kapelyushnikov and Demina (2005) find that outside succession is driven by poor 
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performance while Muravyev (2003b) suggests a higher probability of outside 
succession in firms with a higher return on equity. 
An important issue in most of these studies of the effect of past corporate 
performance of firms on the likelihood of managerial turnover is the distinction between 
voluntary departures and forced resignations of managers (Hermalin and Weisbach 
2003). Distinguishing between the different reasons for CEO change is indeed 
problematic, and many studies disregard these differences due to the unavailability of 
relevant information. The argument in favour of the approach that ignores the 
differences is that when a negative performance-turnover link is detected in the overall 
sample (e.g., covering routine turnover, voluntary leaves, and forced resignations), it is 
still likely to be driven by firing for poor performance. In particular, routine turnover is 
hardly related to performance; and it is far from obvious why poor performance should 
trigger voluntary departures of CEOs. It may be argued that poorly performing 
managers are likely to be willing to stay rather than leave their firms because their 
outside options are bad.  Therefore, the only problem with the approach that pools all 
types of separations together is that the negative performance-turnover relationship 
becomes more difficult to establish. It may simply be not found if the bulk of all 
separations are routine or voluntary. Overall, there seems to be a consensus in the 
literature that a negative performance-turnover relationship reflects boards firing CEOs 
(Hermalin and Weisbach 2003).  
Nevertheless, few attempts to distinguish between different reasons of CEO 
replacement are known in the literature. For example, Rachinsky (2002) uses publicly 
available information on large companies to study managerial turnover in the context of 
the transition economy of Russia and finds that most separations are actually not 
dismissals. However, as acknowledged in the mentioned study, different types of 
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turnover can overlap (even in the case of firing for poor performance, the officially 
announced reason for turnover is often neutral: health conditions, expiration of contract, 
etc.) and therefore the classification of turnover cases is far from objective. 
As regards Ukraine, the evidence concerning the performance – turnover 
relationship is limited. The study by Warzinski (2003) is a notable exception in this 
respect. Based on survey data covering 300 Ukrainian firms, it analyzes determinants 
and consequences of managerial change, as well as the role of privatization and 
competition in improving company performance. Warzinski finds some evidence that 
financial difficulties in private, though not state, firms results in higher probability of 
CEO departure. The study also suggests that managerial change and privatization have a 
positive joint effect on profitability, though the individual effects appear to be 
insignificant. 
Warzinski’s study has several weaknesses stemming largely from the nature and 
quality of the data. First, the sample size is relatively small. Moreover, the data are 
obtained in two Ukrainian regions only. More importantly, the study does not use 
accounting information – performance is measured based on qualitative assessments of 
respondents, who are asked if their firms faced financial difficulties shortly before the 
interviews. The reliability of such subjective data on company performance raises 
substantial concerns about the main findings of the study. 
We conclude that the evidence concerning the relationship between corporate 
performance and managerial turnover, and the overall effectiveness of corporate 
governance, remains scarce for Ukraine. Our paper contributes to filling in this gap. 
 
3. Data and sample description  
In our empirical analysis, we take advantage of a recently established database of 
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Ukrainian joint-tock companies, which is maintained by State Commission on 
Securities and the Stock Market, the country’s regulator. The Commission collects 
essential information about companies and makes it publicly available on its website. 1 
The database covers over 7,000 firms, with the earliest records available in 2001. The 
data contain detailed financial information about firms (annual balance sheets and 
income statements), information on their ownership and governance structures, industry 
affiliation, number of employees, location, etc. There is also a bunch of data about 
firms’ chief executives, including names, gender, and tenure on the managerial 
positions.   
The estimation sample for our empirical analysis is constructed from these data 
in several steps. First, we restrict the sample to open joint-stock companies, dropping all 
observations pertaining to closed joint-stock firms. One reason for such a decision is 
restrictions on transferability of shares in closed corporations, which may have 
implications for managerial turnover.2 More importantly, the disclosure standard for 
closed joint-stock companies is somewhat more lax than for open corporations, 
resulting in the unavailability of essential data about the former type of firms. Second, 
because we want to relate changes in CEOs between the current and preceding periods 
to companies’ performance in the preceding period, we only keep observations with 
complete data in the current and preceding financial years. Constructed along these 
lines, our final sample includes 916 companies with a total of 3,934 observations over a 
5-year period from 2002 to 2006.  
In the process of data collection, we attempted to trace exact reasons for changes 
in CEOs in Ukrainian firms. In doing so, we have been looking at publicly available 
                                                 
1 The Internet address is www.smida.gov.ua, the link effective as of May 2008. 
2 Comparing open and closed joint-stock companies is an interesting research topic that is outside of the 
scope of this paper. 
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data sources about Ukrainian companies, such as State Commission on Securities and 
Stock Market’s disclosure server (http://smida.gov.ua), corporate sites, and various 
mass media, most notably Interfax News Agency (http://interfax.com.ua). The 
importance of mass media in covering corporate news has grown considerably in recent 
years, with many cases of changes in management receiving high publicity.  
A complete classification of nearly half a thousand cases of changes in CEOs 
that we observe in the data has proved to be a virtually impossible task, however. The 
principal reason for that is the unavailability of relevant information from earlier years 
and for smaller firms, as well as ambiguous and contradictory information in many 
other instances. Nevertheless, we have identified a couple of dozen cases of routine 
turnover of managers (due to death, health reasons, and retirement because of pension 
age), changes in CEOs due to bankruptcy of firms, as well as a number of cases linked 
to the political process, including cabinet changes. The latter is not a surprise in view of 
abundant evidence of important role of political factors in the Ukrainian economy 
(Baum et al. 2008).  
In particular, we have found several instances of politically-motivated changes 
in CEOs in firms with considerable government ownership – “strategic” enterprises, 
especially among the power utilities and in the metallurgical sector. For example, 
managerial change in “Chornomornaftogas” in 2006 caused a stir as it clearly revealed 
government officials’ fight for a particularly attractive company. Interestingly, despite 
wide coverage of the case in mass media, the officially announced reason for 
managerial change was the expiration of the departing CEO’s contract. This example 
illustrates the tremendous difficulties in identifying the true reasons for managerial 
turnover in Ukraine. 
Given these difficulties, we stay short of providing more details about the 
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reasons underlying turnover of CEOs in Ukrainian firms. Even though we are able to 
exclude 22 admittedly routine changes in CEOs from the final estimation sample, our 
paper essentially follows the standard approach in the literature that does not draw a 
distinction between different types of separations (Hermalin and Weisbach 2003).  
 
4. Methodology 
4.1. Performance measures 
Choosing an indicator that would reliably capture all essential aspects of company 
performance is a non-trivial task in developed economies, and even more so in 
transition and developing countries. For example, Bevan et al. (1999) suggest that poor 
accounting standards and the underdevelopment of stock markets force researchers  
studying enterprise performance in transition economies to place less emphasis on 
indicators that are based on capital stock, assets, or equity.  
In particular, the use of Tobin’s Q, a traditional measure of the expected long-
run performance of firms, is virtually ruled out in the transition context because of the 
absence, or a very limited role, of stock markets. There are also problems associated 
with the use of total factor productivity owing to low reliability of the capital stock data. 
Imprecise estimates of capital coupled with endogeneity of profit plague profitability 
ratios, such as return on equity.3  
These difficulties lead researchers studying enterprise performance in emerging 
and transition countries to adopt indicators that are less common in the context of 
developed economies. For example, Bevan et al. (1999) consider the share of exports in 
sales to be a particularly useful indicator of enterprise performance in the transition 
                                                 
3 The biggest concern is profit if measured net of taxes because taxes are often viewed as endogenous 
rather than parametric (Schaffer 1998). 
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environment. Gibson (2003) uses accounting measures of performance such as earnings 
before interest and taxes scaled by assets, the change in earnings scaled by lagged 
assets, and growth in sales. The study by Warzinski (2003) employs a rather peculiar 
performance measure, a dummy that indicates if a firm faced financial difficulties in the 
preceding period, according to managers’ subjective responses while Barberis et al. 
(1996) consider a bunch of restructuring indices, such as shop renovations. A number of 
scholars choose labor productivity as the most suitable performance measure (e.g., Earle 
1998; Kouznetsov and Muravyev 2001); however, this measure is appropriate for short-
term analysis only, as it is based on the implicit assumption that the level of capital 
remains unchanged. 
Understanding the pros and cons of various measures of firm performance, as well 
as potential differences in their interpretation, we opt for using several indicators instead 
of choosing and defending a single one. In particular, our focus will be on labor 
productivity (LP), return on sales (ROS), and return on assets (ROA). This list 
deliberately omits return on equity (ROE), one of the measures that can easily be 
computed from the data. Such an omission is not an accident. In the data we have, there 
are more than 100 firms having negative equity, according to their balance sheets.4 
Thus, in case such a firm reports losses in the last financial year, one obtains a positive 
value of ROE from the division of one negative number (financial loss) by another one 
(negative equity). Clearly, the calculated positive value has nothing to do with the actual 
performance of the firm. While there are credible concerns about the other measures of 
performance, including labor productivity, return on sales, and return on assets, we 
believe that the magnitude of possible accounting distortions is much smaller in these 
cases.  
                                                 
4 This is typical in an inflationary environment when firms that do not regularly revalue their fixed assets 
incur considerable losses. 
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4.2. Econometric models 
The focus of this study is the link between CEO turnover on the one hand and firm 
performance on the other. The outcome in our analysis can be represented by a 
dichotomous variable which equals to one in case of CEO dismissal between two 
adjacent years and zero otherwise. Because of the binary outcome variable, we use the 
logit model to estimate the following CEO turnover equation: 
Cit= Λ (α+β*Performancet-1+X it-1γ)                          (1) 
where i indexes firms, t corresponds to period, Cit is a dummy variable for a change in 
CEO between years t-1 and t, Performancet-1 is a measure of firm performance in period 
t-1, Xit-1 is a vector of control variables that characterize firms and their managers, and Λ 
is the cumulative density function of the logistic distribution. The parameter of interest 
is β, which we expect to be negative.  
Based on previous studies of determinants of managerial turnover, we include 
the following characteristics of firms and their managers in vector X:  
• a variable measuring the size of a company’s supervisory board, the organ that is 
empowered to monitor managers and fire them in case of poor performance. The 
optimal size of the board has been subject of controversy in the literature (e.g., Jensen 
1993). Board size has been found an important determinant of CEO change in Yermack 
(1996), Borokhovich et al. (1996), and Huson et al. (2001). Hermalin and Weisbach 
(2003) provide an extended list of studies documenting a negative relationship between 
board size and corporate performance in their survey of corporate boards in developed 
economies.  
• measures of leverage and liquidity, which are supposed to control for firms’ 
financial constraints. High leverage and/or low liquidity are likely to rise the probability 
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of bankruptcy and the threat of bankruptcy may cause higher CEO turnover. 
• firm size (measured by the natural logarithm of total assets or by the natural 
logarithm of employment). This variable is highly relevant in our analysis as larger 
firms may have a bigger pool of internal successors for a departing manager so that 
these firms face smaller costs of finding a new CEO. 
• chief executives’ ownership stakes. We expect that managerial ownership 
inhibits managerial turnover by promoting, ceteris paribus, entrenchment of the 
incumbents.5  
• the gender of managers. There is a growing attention in the corporate finance 
literature to gender composition of corporate boards and the gender of chief executives 
(Rose 2007, Francoeur et. al. 2008,). The interest is sparked by the existence of 
differences between men and women, for example, in risk aversion, which may translate 
into different behavior as directors and managers (Schubert et. al. 1999, Stelter 2002, 
Coleman 2003, Igbal et. al. 2006). We hypothesize that boards may have a gender bias 
in evaluating CEO performance and therefore include a dummy variable indicating 
CEOs’ gender in our econometric model.  
• managerial experience (number of years of work on managerial positions) and 
age. Managers’ experience is another important variable in our analysis that may help 
shed more light on the role of managerial human capital. On the one hand, managerial 
experience, which characterizes accumulation of professional knowledge and 
acquisition of managerial techniques, may be a valuable asset to the firm. On the other 
hand, greater managerial experience, ceteris paribus, implies older managers who may 
have insufficient ability to run firms in a market environment if much of their skills 
                                                 
5 It is worth noting that managerial ownership may be positively associated with performance as 
managers have stronger incentives to exert effort when their ownership stake is larger (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). This incentive effect of managerial ownership works in the opposite direction to the 
entrenchment effect.  
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were acquired in the Soviet time. We include both managerial age and experience in our 
regressions in order to separate these effects. 
• industry and region fixed effects represented by a set of dummy variables.6  
A potentially interesting extension of the baseline analysis comes from 
augmenting the econometric model with interactions of performance with a number of 
control variables comprising vector X. Such an extension provides evidence as to 
whether the strength of the performance-turnover relationship varies with different 
characteristics of firms, most notable ownership and board size.7 We conduct such an 
analysis interacting performance with managerial ownership, board size, and industry 
affiliation of firms.   
In addition to the baseline specification (1), we model managerial turnover as a 
time-dependent event using hazard models that explicitly take into account the timing of 
changes in CEOs.  Following Geddes and Hrishikesh (1997), the determinants of CEO 
tenure are estimated using the following proportional hazard model specification: 
L(t|X) =L0 (t)exp(Xb)                                                                               (2) 
where L(t) is the base-line hazard,  t is the duration of a manager’s life in the company, 
X is a vector of explanatory variables and b is a vector of unknown parameters to be 
estimated. The most common methods for estimating hazard models with time varying 
covariates are the discrete time and Cox proportional Hazard models (Jenkins, 2004). 
Shumway (2001) showed that they produce similar results, but the former method is 
computationally more efficient. 
As we want to capture the degree of tolerance, a spell could be defined as a 
                                                 
6 Industry affiliation may affect the cost of replacing CEOs as it is related to the ease of finding an outside 
successor. If a company belongs to an industry consisting of very heterogeneous firms, finding an outside 
successor may be difficult as many potential candidates may not possess adequate (firm-)specific human 
capital. 
7 For example, entrenchment of managers, which is facilitated by managerial ownership, may become a 
particularly severe problem when it comes along with managerial incompetence. 
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period without CEO turnover. Since we have one exit from the spell, we estimate this 
model using the complementary log-log regression.8 The dependent variable is equal to 
one for the last period a CEO worked in the company and zero otherwise. 
To capture the "patience" effects we employ a fully non-parametric baseline 
hazard function. We do this by defining dummy variables which correspond to the spell 
duration. For example, if the maximum survival time is four, we will have three dummy 
variables. 
 
5. Regression results 
5.1. Logit model 
To estimate the effect of firm performance on CEO turnover we employ five 
specifications that differ in terms of performance indicators and control variables used. 
The dependent variable in all regressions is binary variable CHANGE that indicates 
CEO turnover between the current and preceding periods. As discussed above, our 
analysis focuses on three measures of performance: return on assets (ROA), which is the 
ratio of net profit to assets, return on sales (ROS), which is the ratio of net profit to 
sales, and labor productivity (LP), which is the ratio of sales to the number of workers 
employed. 
In addition to the main regressor, which measures firm performance, our 
econometric models include several other characteristics of firms and of their managers. 
Financial constraints facing the firms are approximated with leverage (LEVERAGE), 
which is the ratio of short-term and long-term debt to assets (in fact, debt-to-equity ratio 
is inappropriate because of the above-discussed problems with measurement of equity). 
                                                 
4 The complementary log-log regression estimates the probability that an event happens to an individual 
in some time interval, given that the individual did not face this event in earlier periods. The logit model 
for such a continuous-time process is not plausible. 
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Liquidity (LIQUIDITY) is measured as the ratio of working capital to short-term debt. 
Since we expect to find a negative relationship between CEO turnover and lagged 
performance of firms, we use lagged values of ROA, ROS, and labor productivity, as 
well as of financial constraints, in the regressions.  
Firm size is proxied by either the natural logarithm of assets (SIZE) or the natural 
logarithm of employment (SIZE_LABOR). Variable EXPERIENCE is measured as the 
number of years of work record on managerial positions, and variable BOARD captures 
the number of directors in the supervisory board. The regressions also include variable 
FEMALE, which is a dummy for the CEO’s gender. 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis. 
Rather surprisingly, Ukrainian joint stock companies appear to be, on average, 
unprofitable, as the mean values of ROA and ROS are negative. The other financial 
ratios show that firms are, on average, financially stable. In particular, the ratio of debt-
to-equity is 1:2, and firms’ current liabilities are covered by working capital more than 
three times.  As regards chief executives, they are, on average, 50 years old and have 18 
years of experience. Supervisory boards consist of three to four members on average.  
We also compare summary statistics for two groups of firms: those that have not 
changed their CEOs during the whole period under study and those that have changed 
their managers at least once. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for both types of firms. 
It turns out that firms with no change in CEO are more frequently headed by executives 
who are males and who are also older and more experienced compared with managers 
of firms in the complimentary group. In particular, the mean experience of managers is 
19 years in the former group and only 16 years in the latter group.  
 Managerial turnover is more typical of larger firms, which also have somewhat 
larger supervisory boards. Firms that experience no change in managers have higher 
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liquidity, return on sales and return on assets, and also appear to be less leveraged. In 
other words, the reported financial indicators suggest a link between financial risk 
facing companies and managerial turnover. In particular, managers of high-leveraged 
firms are more likely to lose their jobs even though these firms may be more profitable, 
as the corporate finance literature suggests.  
Overall, the univariate analysis reveals substantial differences in the 
characteristics of the two groups of firms. A multivariate regression analysis that 
follows will help to understand the interplay between these various factors and the main 
outcome of interest, CEO turnover.   
Our baseline regression results are reported in Table 3. Columns (1), (2) and (3) 
show the estimation results for specifications with firm size measured by the natural 
logarithm of assets, and columns (4) and (5) by the natural logarithm of employment. 
The indicators of firm performance are ROA in columns (1) and (4), ROS in columns 
(2) and (5), and labor productivity (LP) in column (3).  
The estimates obtained are in line with our predictions. Managerial turnover is 
negatively and statistically significantly related to firm performance measured by ROS, 
and especially ROA. In particular, an increase in ROA by three standard deviations 
reduces the likelihood of CEO turnover by about 6% (see columns 1 and 4). The 
negative correlation between ROS and managerial turnover is observed only in the 
specification with firm size measured by the number of employees. A change in ROS 
has a much smaller impact on CEO turnover than a similar change in ROA. In contrast 
to these performance indicators, labor productivity appears to have no statistically and 
economically significant effects on CEO turnover. Overall, the results are similar to the 
findings by Muravyev (2003a) and Kapelyushnikov and Demina (2005) for Russia and 
suggest a certain degree of effectiveness of corporate governance in Ukrainian 
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companies. In contrast to these earlier studies, our results show a greater role of 
financial indicators in triggering CEO turnover. 
Table 3 also shows a number of interesting results related to the role of firms’ 
financial constraints. For example, leverage has a significant positive impact on the 
probability of CEO turnover in all five specifications. This is consistent with Jensen 
(1989), who regards leverage as a crucial constraint on managerial discretion. In 
contrast, liquidity has no statistically or economically significant effect on CEO change.  
The regression results do not show any statistically or economically significant 
effect of supervisory board size on the probability of CEO turnover. This is a somewhat 
puzzling result. Studies from other countries suggest an important role of board size and 
composition in monitoring and replacing CEOs, according to the survey article by 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003). We, however, find that larger companies, ceteris 
paribus, are more likely to experience a change in CEO, regardless of how we measure 
firm size.  
As regards characteristics of managers such as gender and experience, they appear 
to have no effect on CEO turnover in Ukrainian firms. However, managerial ownership 
has negative and statistically significant effect on the probability of turnover. An 
increase in the equity stake of the manager by 1% reduces the probability of her 
dismissal by 0.3%. Our study thus confirms the adverse role of managerial 
entrenchment, long suggested in the corporate governance literature.    
We also test whether the strengths of the performance-turnover relationship varies 
with supervisory board size and CEO share ownership. With this purpose, we introduce 
interaction terms between these characteristics and firm performance. Interestingly, the 
coefficients of these interactions turn out to be statistically insignificant. The 
coefficients on the other variables remain pretty similar to those reported in the baseline 
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regressions.9  
We also investigate the link between CEO turnover and the relative performance 
of companies (that is, relative to other firms in the same industry). The idea is that such 
a relative measure is a better indicator of the quality of management than firm 
performance per se.  Indeed, company performance is subject to various shocks, which 
may have nothing to do with managerial decisions. For example, poor performance of a 
particular company may be a consequence of a decline in the whole industry, rather than 
a result of mismanagement. Thus, shareholders and supervisory boards may place 
stronger emphasis on such a relative evaluation when deciding the future of corporate 
executives.10  
In this study, relative performance is measured as the difference between the 
company’s performance indicator and the average performance in the relevant industry, 
distinguished by two-digit industry codes. The regression results for the standard logit 
specifications are shown in Table 4. In general, they are pretty similar to the previous 
estimates. The main result is that poor relative performance of a company in terms of 
relative ROA triggers CEO change, while the other measures of relative performance do 
not appear to be strong signals for the dismissal of managers.    
Another interesting issue is whether firm performance has differential impacts 
on CEO turnover in different industries. We check this by interacting firm performance 
with industry dummies. The results from estimating the five familiar specifications are 
reported in Table 5. Note that of all industry-performance interactions, the table shows 
only those with statistically significant coefficients. There are a number of interesting 
                                                 
9 These results are not reported in the paper, but are available on request from the authors. 
10 For a detailed discussion of relative performance evaluation, see for example, Holmstrom (1982) and 
Parrino (1997). 
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results. The negative effect of ROA on managerial turnover is observed in the 
construction materials and construction industries. ROS has a strong impact on 
managerial dismissal in the food processing, textile, construction materials, energy, and 
construction sectors. Strong effects of labour productivity are visible in the 
metallurgical and electronic tools industries. Of all these industry effects, the strongest 
relationship (from the statistical viewpoint) is observed in the construction materials 
industry. We believe that this pattern can be explained by a considerable number of 
firms comprising this industry as well as by its considerable homogeneity, implying that 
the performance of a firm provides a better signal for shareholders and supervisory 
boards about the quality of management than in more concentrated and less 
homogenous sectors.   
 
5.2 Survival analysis  
In this part of our analysis we first define a dummy variable indicating survival of 
managers and then use it to generate a dependent variable for the hazard model. This 
latter variable takes the value of one in the last period of a CEO’s life in the company 
and zero otherwise. Next, we screen the data in order to remove observations 
corresponding to firms with no managerial turnover in 2001-2006 as well as firms 
experiencing changes in CEO in each consecutive period. This screening procedure 
results in a restricted sample embracing 1,246 firm-year observations.  
Two further restrictions on the sample come from the left-censoring (no 
information about the exact date a CEO was appointed in the past) and unavailability of 
lagged firm-specific variables. As a result, the final sample for estimating the hazard 
model consists of only 633 firm-year observations.  
 23
Firm-specific variables and variables characterizing managers that enter the 
hazard models are constructed in the same manner as in the previous logit analysis. 
Specifically, the list of regressors includes measures of performance, leverage, liquidity, 
firm size, managerial share ownership, supervisory board size, as well as managers’ 
gender, age, and experience. Descriptive statistics of these variables for the restricted 
sample of 633 observations are shown in Table 6. We expect these variables to affect 
CEO survival in the same manner as they affect CEO turnover in the logit model.  
The results from estimating the discrete time hazards model (complementary log-
log) are presented in Table 7. It should be noted that the hazard models can be treated 
both semi-parametrically and non-parametrically. In order to obtain consistent estimates 
in case the baseline hazard is poorly specified, we use the latter approach. The baseline 
hazard in columns (1), (2), and (3) therefore consists of the following periods: (i) one, 
(ii) two years, (iii) three years, and (iv) four years inclusive. A positive coefficient on a 
variable indicates its positive contribution to the hazard rate and a decreased survival 
time of a chief executive.  
According to the estimates shown in Table 7, more experienced CEOs are less 
likely to survive in the firms. We also observe negative and statistically significant 
coefficients on variable LEVERAGE. This result, implying that a higher level of debt is 
associated with a lower likelihood of dismissal, is counterintuitive and contradicts the 
conventional theory. The regressions do not suggest any role of firm performance, 
supervisory board size, financial constrains measured by liquidity, as well as firm size 
on survival time. In other words, leverage and experience appear to be the only 
significant factors in the survival models. 
One caveat in the survival analysis presented above is a rather short time interval 
during which we observe CEOs holding their posts. The problem stems from the fact 
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that we deal with a short panel; it is also exacerbated by missing data on supervisory 
board size and employment in 2001, which leads to the loss of observations from 2000 
and 2001. The other reason for a dramatic reduction in the number of observations is the 
(necessary) screening procedure, which eliminates firms without CEO turnover during 
the whole period under study as well as firms experiencing changes in CEO during 
consecutive years.   
The data at hand show that many firms with one or two CEO changes are tracked 
during three or four years only. Consequently, managerial histories are not long enough 
to get a sound understanding of the turnover process. Moreover, it can also be the case 
that firms without CEO turnover, which we had to exclude from the sample, are 
systematically different from the remaining firms. Indeed, the excluded firms may be 
more stable and of better quality in terms of corporate governance, as evidenced by 
regular and punctual submission of reports to the national regulator. Another peculiarity 
of the CEO’s tenure is the observation that the “birth” of a new manager can take place 
in the last period. For instance, even though we are able to track most firms over five 
years, we cannot identify the start date for previous CEOs, who typically had much 
longer tenures compared with incumbents. Thus, the survival analysis faces the problem 
of limited timing, and we believe that the differences between the results obtained from 
the logit model and the hazard model can be attributed to this factor. In other words, the 
results obtained from different specifications of the logit model appear to be more 
reliable than those from the hazard model.  
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper studies the relationship between managerial turnover and firm performance 
in Ukraine. We use a new sample of open joint-stock companies that operated in the 
 25
country in 2002-2006, a period of robust economic growth and intensive restructuring. 
Our analysis is based on several specifications of the standard logit model, as well as on 
the discrete time hazard model. In order to mitigate distortions in measures of firm 
performance, which stem from deficient accounting practices, we use multiple 
indicators of performance: ROA, ROS, and labor productivity. In addition, we measure 
performance of a firm relative to other firms in the same industry, which may be a better 
indicator of managerial effort in the firm. 
Our main result is the presence of a negative relationship between the likelihood 
of CEO dismissal and firm performance, especially if the latter is measured by return on 
assets. This suggests that corporate governance in Ukraine shows a certain degree of 
efficiency. We also find that larger ownership by managers reduces the likelihood of 
managerial turnover. The size of supervisory boards appears to play no significant role 
in CEO turnover. Interestingly, Ukrainian managers are financially constrained in their 
activities: the probability of a CEO’s departure turns out to be related to the firm’s 
leverage. We do not observe any significant effect of liquidity, however.  The inclusion 
of interaction terms between performance measures on the one hand and supervisory 
board size and managerial ownership on the other hand does not provide any additional 
insight into the functioning of Ukraine’s managerial labor market. The results from the 
hazard model are very weak and do not suggest any relationships between firm 
performance and CEOs’ survival time. We attribute this to the limitations of the data 
available, in particular, to the fact that our panel is too short.  
Our results are of particular interest in view of the ongoing changes in Ukrainian 
corporate law, and in particular, the recent enactment of Law on Joint-Stock 
Companies. According to the regulations that existed before the adoption of the new 
law, the right to dismiss executives belonged exclusively to the shareholder’s meeting. 
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Supervisory boards, while having some authority to initiate management changes, had 
rather limited power in deciding the future of CEOs. The new law changes the balance 
of power in favour of supervisory boards. It also establishes a minimum size of 
supervisory boards. The proponents of these changes argue that they would produce 
more efficient response to poor performance of managers. Whether such a redistribution 
of power within the firm leads to better monitoring of managers and improves corporate 
performance may be an interesting topic for future research. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the sample used in the logit regressions. 
Variable Definition Mean Standard Deviation 
Number of 
observations 
CHANGE Equals one if change take place in this period 0.102 0.302 3,012 
FEMALE Equals one if female 0.090 0.287 3,012 
EXPERIENCE Number of years of experienceon executive position 18.245 9.809 3,012 
AGE CEO age 50.319 8.876 3,012 
BOARD Number of members in the supervisory board 3.483 1.737 3,012 
SHARE The share ownership of CEO 11.733 18.557 3,012 
LEVERAGE The ratio of debts to assets 0.327 0.279 3,012 
LIQUIDITY The ratio of working capital to short-term debts 3.379 4.593 3,012 
SIZE Log of firm’s assets 8.720 1.582 3,012 
Assets Firm’s assets 26899.68 69153.21 3,012 
SIZE_LABOR Log of employed  4.900 1.259 3,012 
Employment Number of people employed 319.506 559.583 3,012 
ROA The ratio of net profit to assets -0.009 0.089 3,012 
ROS The ratio of net profit to sales -0.054 0.183 3,012 
LP The ratio of sales to the number of employed 62.343 78.403 3,012 
BOARD*ROA Interaction of board size and ROA -0.032 0.308 3,012 
BOARD*ROS Interaction of board size and ROS -0.180 0.633 3,012 
BOARD*LP Interaction of board size and LP 212.966 291.815 3,012 
SHARE*ROA Interaction of share ownership of CEO and ROA -0.015 1.236 3,012 
SHARE *ROS Interaction of share ownership of CEO and ROS -0.239 1.709 3,012 
SHARE *LP Interaction of share ownership of CEO and LP 556.198 1151.805 3,012 
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 Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the variables, by CEO turnover. 
 
 Firms without CEO turnover during the whole period under consideration 
Firms with CEO turnover during the 
whole period under consideration 
Variable  Mean Standard deviation 
Number of 
observations Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Number of 
observations
t 
FEMALE 0.081 0.273 2,004 0.108 0.311 1,008 2.423 
EXPERIENCE 19.256 9.542 2,004 16.234 10.025 1,008 -8.064 
AGE 51.488 8.370 2,004 47.996 9.385 1,008 -10.368 
BOARD 3.409 1.691 2,004 3.632 1.816 1,008 3.335 
SHARE 15.198 20.519 2,004 4.844 10.993 1,008 -14.975 
LEVERAGE 0.297 0.265 2,004 0.388 0.296 1,008 8.500 
LIQUIDITY 3.617 4.747 2,004 2.906 4.233 1,008 -4.021 
SIZE 8.540 1.461 2,004 9.080 1.743 1,008 8.957 
Assets 19487.137 55437.939 2,004 41636.519 88651.644 1,008 8.390 
SIZE_LABOR 4.792 1.160 2,004 5.114 1.412 1,008 6.662 
Employment 257.212 453.906 2,004 443.354 709.509 1,008 8.721 
 ROA   0.000 0.085 2,004 -0.026 0.093 1,008 -7.774 
 ROS   -0.042 0.174 2,004 -0.078 0.197 1,008 -5.122 
 LP   56.986 68.852 2,004 79.992 93.701 1,008 5.312 
BOARD*ROA -0.003 0.292 2,004 -0.089 0.329 1,008 -7.333 
BOARD*ROS -0.141 0.605 2,004 -0.259 0.679 1,008 -4.857 
BOARD*LP 188.880 249.833 2,004 260.850 356.402 1,008 6.403 
SHARE*ROA 0.089 1.382 2,004 -0.132 0.861 1,008 -4.628 
SHARE *ROS -0.218 1.849 2,004 -0.283 1.390 1,008 -0.987 
SHARE *LP 700.665 1254.331 2,004 268.983 844.496 1,008 -9.860 
Note: The last column shows the test for the equality of means in two groups of firms. 
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 Table 3. Regression results from the logit model. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
FEMALE           -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
                       (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) 
EXPERIENCE   -0.000   -0.000   -0.000   -0.000 -0.000 
                       (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
AGE  -0.000   -0.000   -0.000   -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
BOARD             0.001   0.001   0.001   0.001 0.001 
                       (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
SHARE -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LEVERAGE 0.038* 0.058*** 0.062*** 0.042** 0.059*** 
                       (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
LIQUIDITY 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
SIZE                0.009*** 0.006** 0.006   
                       (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)   
ROA                 -0.227***   -0.218***  
                       (0.055)   (0.054)  
ROS                  -0.031   -0.042* 
                        (0.023)   (0.024) 
LP                   -0.000   
   (0.000)   
SIZE_LABOR    0.012*** 0.011*** 
    (0.004) (0.004) 
Number of 
observations 3017 3016 3013 3013 3012 
Log likelihood -914.405 -920.657 -922.931 -913.802 -919.049 
Pseudo R2 0.081 0.072 0.072 0.081 0.074 
Note: The dependent variable equals to one if there is CEO turnover in a given year and zero 
otherwise. The table reports marginal effects after logit estimation. Cluster-robust standard errors are 
in brackets. Marginal effects are estimated around mean points. The intercept, region and industry 
dummies are included in the regressions but not reported. *, **, *** correspond to 10, 5, and 1% level 
of significance, respectively. 
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Table 4. Regression results from the logit model: relative performance measures. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
FEMALE           -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
                       (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) 
EXPERIENCE   -0.000   -0.000   -0.000   -0.000 -0.000 
                       (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
AGE  -0.000   -0.000   -0.000   -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
BOARD             0.001   0.001   0.001   0.001 0.001 
                       (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
SHARE -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LEVERAGE 0.038* 0.058** 0.061*** 0.042** 0.060*** 
                       (0.018) (0.022) (0.019) (0.019) (0.022) 
LIQUIDITY 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
SIZE                0.009** 0.006 0.006   
                       (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)   
ROA _relative   -0.227***   -0.217***  
                       (0.055)   (0.053)  
ROS_relative      -0.025   -0.026 
                        (0.111)   (0.109) 
LP_relative          -0.000   
   (0.000)   
SIZE_LABOR    0.012*** 0.009* 
    (0.004) (0.005) 
Number of 
observations 3,017 3,017 3,013 3,013 3,013 
Log likelihood -914.407 -923.081 -922.976 -913.803 -922.111 
Pseudo R2 0.081 0.072 0.072 0.081 0.072 
Note: The dependent variable equals to one if there is CEO turnover in a given year and zero otherwise. 
The table reports marginal effects after logit estimation. Cluster-robust standard errors are in brackets. 
Marginal effects are estimated around mean points. The intercept, region and industry dummies are 
included in the regressions but not reported. *, **, *** correspond to 10, 5, and 1% level of significance, 
respectively. 
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Table 5. Regression results from the logit model: differences across industries. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
FEMALE    -0.001    -0.000 -0.004    -0.002   - 0.001 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.011) (0.016) (0.016) 
EXPERIENCE     0.000    -0.000  -0.000    0.000  -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
AGE     -0.000    -0.000  -0.000   -0.000  -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
SHARE     -0.003***    -0.003***  -0.002***   -0.003***  -0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
BOARD    0.001      0.001     0.001  0.001        0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
LEVERAGE    0.039** 0.052*** 0.044*** 0.044** 0.055*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.013) (0.018) (0.018) 
LIQUIDITY 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
SIZE      0.010***    0.008**    0.006**   
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)   
ROA   -0.134   -0.119  
 (0.083)   (0.080)  
ROAind6 -0.987**   -1.050**  
 (0.489)   (0.486)  
ROAind12 -0.931*   -0.905*  
 (0.512)   (0.505)  
ROS    0.049   0.036 
  (0.034)   (0.035) 
ROSind2  -0.926**   -0.882** 
  (0.446)   (0.450) 
ROSind3  -84.575*   -78.012* 
  (46.754)   (46.489) 
ROSind6  -0.909***   -0.901** 
  (0.279)   (0.280) 
ROSind11  -0.427**   -0.406* 
    (0.212)   (0.211) 
ROSind12    -0.984**      -0.946** 
  (0.392)     (0.392) 
LP   0.000   
   (0.000)   
LPind7      6.242***   
   (0.475)   
LPind8   -0.028**   
   (0.011)   
SIZE_LABOR       0.012***    0.011*** 
    (0.004) (0.004) 
Number of observations 3,017 3,016 3,013 3,013 3,012 
Log likelihood -909.670        -909.568        -914.734       -909.051         -908.630    
Pseudo R2 0.085 0.083 0.080 0.086 0.084 
Note: The dependent variable equals to one if there is CEO turnover in a given year and zero otherwise. 
The table reports marginal effects after logit estimation. Cluster-robust standard errors are in brackets. 
Marginal effects are estimated around mean points. The intercept, region and industry dummies are 
included in the regressions but not reported. Interactions between performance measures and industry 
dummies are included for all the dummies; however, the table only shows the statistically significant 
ones. Ind2 refers to Food Production, ind3 – Textile, ind6 – Construction Materials, ind7 – Metallurgy, 
ind8 – Electronic Tools, ind11 – Energy, ind12 – Construction. *, **, *** correspond to 10, 5, and 1% 
level of significance, respectively. 
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Table 6. Descriptive statistics for the sample used in the survival analysis. 
 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation
Number of 
observations 
FEMALE 0.126 0.333 633 
SHARE 5.301 11.333 633 
EXPERIENCE 17.848 10.185 633 
AGE 49.730 9.618 633 
BOARD 3.588 2.019 633 
LEVERAGE 0.370 0.309 633 
LIQUIDITY 3.183 4.342 633 
SIZE 8.988 1.808 633 
Assets 46132.54 113015.8 633 
SIZE_LABOR 4.946 1.475 632 
Employment 436.536 813.884 633 
ROA -0.033 0.100 633 
ROS -0.078 0.207 632 
LP 82.233 133.199 633 
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 Table 7. Cloglog estimates of the survival function. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
FEMALE  -0.210 -0.240 -0.240 
  (0.449) (0.455) (0.454) 
SHARE -0.004 -0.007 -0.003 
  (0.012) (0.021) (0.021) 
EXPERIENCE  0.053** 0.052** 0.051** 
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
AGE -0.020 -0.019 -0.018 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) 
BOARD  0.001 0.010 0.005 
  (0.087) (0.088) (0.086) 
LEVERAGE -1.055* -1.091* -1.191** 
  (0.586) (0.580) (0.555) 
LIQUIDITY 0.002 0.002 0.006 
  (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) 
SIZE  -0.190 -0.187 -0.193 
  (0.116) (0.115) (0.119) 
ROA 1.344   
  (1.277)   
ROS  0.574  
   (0.568)  
LP   0.001 
    (0.001) 
Number of 
observations  487 632 633 
Log likelihood  -124.078 -123.801 -124.342 
Note: The dependent variable equals to one in the last period of CEO’s “life” and zero 
otherwise. The table reports the results from the non-parametrical complementary log-log 
model. Cluster-robust standard errors are in brackets. The intercept, region, industry and 
“patience” dummies are included in the regressions but not reported. *, **, *** correspond to 
10, 5, and 1% level of significance, respectively. 
 
